, Chinese and North Vietnamese military leaders began planning coordinated defensive activities in preparation for a potential U.S. invasion. Niu Jun, a mainland scholar who has long attracted a following in the West, concludes that American escalation greatly influenced the scope of Chinese assistance for the military struggle in South Vietnam. 4 Other studies of Chinese Vietnam policy demonstrate that Kennedy's escalation in South Vietnam compelled the Chinese to increase their support for insurgency and also facilitated Mao's effort to accelerate revolutionary dynamism at home and radicalize Chinese foreign policy. Chen Jian shows that Chinese Vietnam policy began a radical turn in late 1962 and early 1963, following visits to Beijing by Hanoi officials who warned that U.S. escalation in the South and intensified fighting could lead to wider war with America. By March 1963, Hanoi had assurances from Beijing that the Chinese would defend North Vietnam if the Americans attacked. Mao and Zhou separately repeated this promise to DRV officials in the summer of 1964. Qiang Zhai also argues convincingly that Mao did not really press hard in Vietnam until after the summer of 1962, which followed Kennedy's establishment of the Military Assistance Command (MAC), drastically increasing the number of U.S. advisors in Vietnam and American equipment provided to Diem's regime. In August, 1962 Mao crushed Wang Jiaxiang's efforts to convince the Chinese leadership to show restraint in its support of revolutionary movements. Mao's condemnation, Zhai says, revealed his limited tolerance for independent opinions and set China on a policy of confrontation short of war with America in Vietnam. 5 Chen's and Zhai's work, along with the previously mentioned scholarship by mainland historians, provides a basis for evaluating how accurate assessments of Chinese intentions were during the Kennedy administration and the degree to which Chinese involvement in Vietnam stemmed from U.S. actions.
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More recent scholarship on the origins of the Vietnam War has shown that Kennedy's anxieties about China informed his unwillingness to pursue a diplomatic solution in Vietnam. Though he blames Johnson for Americanizing the war, Fredrik Logevall admits that Kennedy feared negotiating on Vietnam would harm his credibility and expose him to a domestic political attack similar to what President Harry Truman had endured for "losing" China.
7 Logevall may be correct in concluding that Johnson's concern with personal credibility, more than anything else, pushed him to Americanize the war, but he fails to show that the dynamics of the credibility problem originated in America's reaction to the Chinese Revolution and developed in response to the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations' anxieties regarding the PRC.
5. Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC, 2001) , 207-9; Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950 -1975 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000 , 114-15. Wang Jiaxiang was the director of the International Liaison Depart of the CCP Central Committee. On February 26, 1962, he sent a letter to foreign policy officials, including Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yi, criticizing CCP tendencies to overstate the danger of war and calling for restraint in support of national liberation movements. 7. Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of the War in Vietnam (Berkeley, CA, 1999) , 31. Logevall's monograph challenged leading interpretations of the Vietnam War, which saw the conflict as the logical result of U.S. containment policy. See, for example, George C. Herring's America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950 -1975 (Philadelphia, PA, 1979 ; Robert Schulzinger, A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941 -1975 (New York, 1997 ; David Anderson, ed., Shadow on the White House: Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945 -1975 (Lawrence, KS, 1993 ; William Duiker, US Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina (Stanford, CA, 1994) ; Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945 -1990 (New York, 1991 .
Understanding how the United States got entangled in Vietnam and why China was involved is one of the more important questions in American history. The conflict strained America's Cold War alliances and weakened the U.S. economy. It brought the world's most powerful military near to its breaking point and permanently eroded the American people's trust in government. More tragically, it caused millions of casualties and left an enduring legacy of environmental damage from chemical weapons and unexploded ordnance. In the years leading up to Americanization in Vietnam, Washington's China watchers made decisions from within a stifling domestic political climate and with very limited access to information. They had little to go on other than reports from the Chinese press, refugees fleeing China's famine, and public statements from the Sino-Soviet dispute, all of which painted the Chinese as radical and aggressive. The narrow framework through which U.S. officials viewed China created an ideological strait jacket that limited their ability to interpret events as they unfolded.
The Kennedy administration inherited its assumptions of Chinese aggressiveness and its hard-line policy toward Beijing from traumas of the late 1940s and early 1950s. China's Revolution and its entrance into the Korean War discredited the Democratic Party and helped bring the China lobby's views into the mainstream. A loose-knit pressure group of Nationalist Chinese officials and right-wing American political and cultural elites dedicated to overthrowing the CCP, the China lobby blasted Truman for "losing" China. By 1951, the press almost universally accepted its explanation of events in the Far East. As President Dwight Eisenhower entered office, Senators Joseph McCarthy (R-WI) and Pat McCarran (D-NV) were leading the campaigns that would gut State Department China expertise and discredit numerous academic China specialists, leaving the lobby's views unchallenged. Democrats and State Department officials now had to denounce China in strident terms in order to protect themselves against the charge of being soft on Communism. Eisenhower staffed his State Department with an eye toward appeasing the China lobby and its allies. Disgraced government China experts like John Stewart Service and John Paton Davies became nonpersons in Washington, a stigma they retained through the Kennedy years. 12 After his narrow electoral victory and with the "loss" of China still haunting the Democrats, Kennedy signaled through his appointments that he had no inclination to challenge the China lobby. 
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The president deployed advisors rather than combat forces, but Chinese leaders found the move no less troubling. In early 1962, the PRC leadership publicly stated that American military actions in Vietnam were aimed indirectly at China and constituted a direct threat to Chinese security. Beijing's statement echoed the warnings it made before intervening in Korea. While the PRC had supported the North Korean invasion, it had not intervened until the UN pushed north of the 38th Parallel. In Kennedy and Truman's interpretation, the United States needed to show strength to face down Communist aggression. But in both cases, aggressive U.S. moves made greater PRC intervention much more likely because it was reacting to a threat, not relentlessly expanding.
On numerous occasions following the NSAM 111 decision, the PRC issued official protests, often using People's Daily editorials, against American escalation in Vietnam. An anonymous New Year's Day editorial, which American analysts attributed to Mao, criticized Kennedy as more aggressive and willing to take risks than Eisenhower. The New Year's editorial stated that only revolutionary struggle could overcome imperialism. China's main foreign policy line, the article claimed, was "to protect and strengthen socialist unity and cooperation in every country and assist the revolutionary struggles of every people and race resisting imperialism and colonialism."
The Specter of an Expansionist China : 9 by guest on April 30, 2013 http://dh.oxfordjournals.org/ movements. His move provided Mao with a pretext to move against him, tighten his own control over foreign policy decision-making, and signal that he would brook no further dissent.
21 By upping the ante in Indochina, the Kennedy administration helped Mao repel an internal challenge to his authority. The U.S. escalation, conceived at least in part to deter China's aggressive tendencies, ended up having the opposite effect.
The numerous SNIEs issued in late 1961 and early 1962 indicate that Chinese intentions were clearly on Kennedy's mind as he considered Taylor's report and pondered escalation. The second of two November SNIEs sounded ominous warnings about China's aims. After admitting that overt military conquest was extremely unlikely, the report warned that "Communist China's long-range goal in the Far East is the complete communization of the area under the hegemony of Peiping." China, the authors concluded, had "little need to resort to overt military invasion in order to enlarge [its] influence or communize other countries." The estimate's authors stated that control over Taiwan, Japan, and India made up Beijing's long-term goals, but "on the basis of opportunity, however, South Vietnam and Laos are currently the primary targets."
22 SNIE thinking reflected the groupthink of the 1950s: Little to no appreciation for traditional SinoVietnamese hostility, taking an implacable Chinese desire for expansionism as its starting premise, and pointing to Vietnam as the place to make a stand.
The SNIE conclusions reinforced the President's own anxieties about the PRC, which in turn underpinned his worries about Diem. If Diem's regime were to fall, Kennedy's Republican rivals would blame him for "losing" another Asian country to Communism-an absolutely unthinkable outcome. But if he followed McNamara's recommendation and deployed hundreds of thousands of ground troops, he could have another Korean War on his hands. The Taylor report's recommendations offered the president a middle path: an increased U.S. military presence capable of raising South Vietnamese morale and keeping the Saigon regime in power, but not enough of an escalation to risk overt Chinese intervention.
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As Kennedy began his second year in office, a few clear patterns in China assessments and efforts to contain China had emerged. Rostow excepted; the administration believed that the PLA was insulated from the famine and still had the capacity to overrun any Southeast Asian military. Ever the hawk, Rostow pressed all year for aggressive intervention, arguing that China's economic crisis gave the United States the opportunity to ratchet up the pressure in Vietnam 26 Kennedy's cautious escalation seemed to confirm that "US strength and determination" could push the Communists into making concessions. Dulles's peripheral containment policy against Beijing, envisioned during the years when "China hand" carried an invisible footnote reading "probably a Commie," had served its purpose. Or so it appeared in Washington. But just in case anyone started feeling too complacent, a dispatch from the American Consulate General in Hong Kong warned Secretary Rusk that Beijing retained its ability to "meddle in Southeast Asia."
27
In October, Chinese forces invaded disputed territories controlled by India and inflicted heavy losses on Indian forces before unilaterally withdrawing, which confirmed to the Kennedy administration both China's aggressive intentions and its undiminished military strength. In light of the crises in Berlin and Cuba, the Chinese offensive underscored the need to stand firm against Beijing.
28
Questions about the Great Leap Forward's consequences now ceased to preoccupy Washington's China watchers. In Beijing, on the other hand, the attack on India ended a dangerous year fraught with skirmishes along the Sino-Indian frontier, Chiang's threats to attack the mainland, American escalation in South Vietnam, and tension on the Sino-Soviet border due to a Kazakh uprising.
Over the prior two years, nearly all analyses of how China's domestic woes would affect its policies in Southeast Asia had affirmed U.S. military commitments to the region, or, more commonly, provided the premises for cautious escalation, pushing the two sides closer to proxy war. To Washington, the Laos neutralization agreement demonstrated that cautious escalation could press the Communists into making concessions. The Chinese, on the other hand, interpreted Kennedy's dispatch of special warfare advisors in South Vietnam, NSAM 111 escalations, and the military deployments in Thailand as alarming signs of growing American aggression.
29 Finally, even Rostow, who thought that famine had weakened China, viewed Chinese weakness not as an opportunity to scale back American financial and military commitments to South Vietnam, but rather as an opening to strike a decisive blow against North Vietnam and NLF infiltration without provoking Chinese retaliation.
The administration's uniform belief in threatening Chinese intentions, along with its seeing both Chinese strength and weakness as a sign to escalate, reflected deep-seated policy assumptions. When men like Taylor, McNamara, or even the president looked to Vietnam, they saw Diem's parlous domestic position as their most immediate concern. Yet Diem was simply the weakest link in the singleminded Far Eastern policy line that the Kennedy administration had retained from the Eisenhower years: Containing and isolating China while maintaining the network of anti-Communist alliances along its periphery. James Thomson, who served in Kennedy's newly reshuffled Bureau of Far Eastern affairs starting in November 1961, affirmed that Dulles's Far Eastern policy, the so-called "loss of China," and the Korean War were central ingredients in the Vietnam War. Thomson also noted that the administration inherited and shared a perception of China on the march, another carry over from the Dulles years but reinforced in the early 1960s by Beijing's harsh public rhetoric.
30 To the White House, Diem's survival and a decisive end to the insurgency offered the chance to make political capital by halting Communist gains in an Asian country, thereby kicking the "who lost China" stigma. Nobody in the White House wanted to let Saigon fall, but if the Southern Vietnamese government could eventually be made stand on its own, it would vindicate the Democratic Party and the members of the Kennedy administration personally. A China without expansionist intentions would render the entire exercise superfluous.
T H E S I N O -SOVIET S P L I T A N D T H E B A T T L E F O R L E A D E R S H I P I N T H E C O M M U N I S T W O R L D
Since the Kennedy administration looked to China's domestic economic troubles and reflexively pondered how they would affect China's expansionist intentions in Southeast Asia, it comes as little surprise that the White House saw the growing Sino-Soviet dispute through the same lens. During Kennedy's first few months in office, a CIA Sino-Soviet Task Force report entitled "The Sino-Soviet Dispute and its Significance" circulated to top policymakers and NSC staffers. The report interpreted the rift as reflecting China's growing strength and an emerging duality of power within the Communist Bloc. It deemed China far more radical than the Soviet Union. Highlighting the 1960 ideological arguments between the two Communist powers over support for independence movements, the report contrasted China's penchant for violence with the Soviet Union's more conciliatory line: "[the] Chinese believed that the Soviet idea of peaceful coexistence was tantamount to abandoning the class struggle."
31 After reading the report, NSC staffers made rethinking China policy a higher priority, though not in the sense of considering recognition.
The CIA's report inspired one NSC staffer, "Blowtorch" Bob Komer, to rethink the entire U.S. containment policy against China. Komer saw a power struggle for dominance of international Communism as the foremost issue driving the Sino-Soviet dispute. Southeast Asia, according to Komer, was basically lost to the Chinese. "We will never be able to jack up feeble countries," Komer continued, "like South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, etc. to the point where they can stand on their own feet vis-à-vis Peiping." He believed that Southeast Asia's twelve million overseas Chinese offered Beijing ample subversive potential in the region. Rather than fight what he saw as a futile effort, Komer recommended pulling back to Japan and India while searching for "a better way of getting Asian nationalism to work for us instead of against us." No naïf when it came to domestic politics, Komer recognized that his proposal would encounter strong China lobby opposition, but he pressed forward nonetheless.
32 He challenged the status quo U.S. China policy but not in a way that demonstrated any rethinking of assumptions inherited from the Dulles years. Komer's China was irredeemably on the march, subversive, more threatening than the Soviets. But whereas Dulles had faith in the American allies on China's periphery, Komer found risible the idea that men like Diem or Chiang could stand up against the Red Chinese juggernaut, regardless of the U.S. support they enjoyed. Kennedy, of course, with much more to lose from a clash with the China lobby so soon after taking office, never adopted Komer's recommendations.
33
Still, Komer's response paper and the CIA report that inspired it signaled a more nuanced approach to China than had existed in the 1950s, but only slightly so. Both dismissed notions of monolithic Communism and identified the rising power struggle within the Communist Bloc. Each noted that the Beijing-Moscow dispute paradoxically discouraged overt Chinese militancy and promoted Chinese support for armed revolutionary movements. Equally important, the CIA report confirmed and added intellectual depth to the Eisenhower-era belief that China was more likely to risk war than the Soviets. The Korean War and racist notions that "Oriental" culture felt indifferent about human losses had led the Eisenhower administration to conclude that the Chinese were more belligerent than the Russians.
34 In their own search for Chinese aggressiveness, Kennedy's advisors and intelligence analysts sought more sophisticated explanations. As opposed to the Soviets, the CIA report stated, the "Chinese see war as inevitable," and believed that the "Bloc should give more support to people fighting revolutionary wars, and should not fear these small wars." The CIA reached these conclusions by taking the PRC's inflammatory rhetoric at face value. With few other information sources and the ever-present China orthodoxy looming in the background, the agency had little chance of doing otherwise, especially with the alarmist John McCone at the helm. In all, both Komer and the CIA found new evidence to support old assumptions.
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By summertime however, Washington's China watchers could not help but notice a shift in Beijing's aggressiveness. Beginning during the spring, the PRC ceased its verbal assaults on American imperialism. In Warsaw Wang Bingnan, China's negotiator with the United States in secret ambassadorial talks, told American representative to the Laos neutralization talks W. Averell Harriman that he hoped the United States would take steps to improve bilateral ties.
36
These signals intrigued State Department officials, including Bowles, Rostow, and Roger Hilsman, who thought the Chinese intended to improve relations with the United States. Not so, the CIA countered. The president followed the CIA's advice, refusing to respond to Chinese signals and thereby rendering less likely any chance to pursue a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. When offered two alternatives about Chinese intentions, the president chose the one which better reflected existing assumptions. Their dalliance with reconsidering Chinese intentions now behind them, policymakers and analysts returned to exploring the Sino-Soviet dispute's implications. By late 1961, they agreed that the conflict promoted a power struggle that would lead Beijing to take a harder line against the West. Unlike Eisenhower-era analyses, which stressed strong cohesive forces holding the Communist alliance together, Kennedy-era analyses recognized that Beijing's challenge to Moscow damaged the alliance enough to make Russia and China competitors rather than partners. As the weaker power, the Chinese could not match Soviet economic or military might and thus had to rely instead on their revolutionary credentials. Unsurprisingly, analysts identified Southeast Asia as the region where China would emerge victorious in its power struggle with the Soviets. A fresh Far Eastern Desk and Policy Planning Council, tasked to challenge old shibboleths, did not necessarily mean the Kennedy administration would adopt less alarmist interpretations of Chinese intentions. In preparation for an important January 2 Policy Planning Council meeting, Mose L. Harvey, a mid-level foreign policy researcher and a former Russian history professor, prepared a draft paper which affirmed that Moscow and Beijing were jockeying for supremacy within the Communist Bloc. Though the rift appeared ideological, Harvey regarded a clash of national interest as its ultimate source.
39 His report represented the administration's boldest assessment yet on the differences between Soviet and Chinese interpretations of Communism and their respective positions within the Bloc. James Thomson, a Far Eastern affairs analyst at State who had earned his PhD in Chinese history studying under John King Fairbank, later wrote that the administration began to accept the finality of the Sino-Soviet split during the first weeks of 1962-after Harvey's draft paper circulated.
40
Harvey's draft report concluded that the Chinese were likely to cause greater problems in Southeast Asia than the Russians. Its circulation led to a debate over whether or not the rift reached the point of no return.
41 Harvey argued that " [r] ivalry between the two big powers" would lead to "a contest for support within the world Communist movement." In this contest, each side would take actions to demonstrate to other Communist countries "that adherence to and applications of its own concepts and views can produce desired results and hence stand proven as correct." Russia's line, Harvey believed, was that the "Communist camp should avoid actions that involve the initiation of violence or that might provoke the initiation of violence by the enemy." On the other hand, Harvey stated that "the Chinese Communists have argued for struggle in all forms, including revolutionary violence and wars of national liberation." Regarding the current Communist campaign in South Vietnam, "the arguments put forward by Moscow in its quarrel with Peiping suggest that this is a type of operation which Moscow does not approve." Following Harvey's analysis, a full break meant that China would have the opportunity to demonstrate the correctness of its line on revolutionary violence by supporting North Vietnam in its struggle against the American-backed Saigon government. His report ended by recommending that the United States take measures in Vietnam "that would significantly increase the difficulties and costs of continued Communist advances."
42 Just months before, several State Department officials had believed the PRC intended to improve ties with the United States, implying that diplomatic solutions to Sino-U.S. differences in Southeast Asia were possible. Now, the State Department officials tasked with challenging past mythology saw only military solutions.
In April, a few months after the Policy Planning Council meeting, Rostow sent a memo to Secretary Rusk which demonstrated that Harvey's ideas had resonated. A draft paper, written by Edward Rice at INR, accompanying Rostow's memo warned that because of the dispute with Moscow "the Chinese are under compulsion to demonstrate that, as against Soviet claims, low cost successes can be achieved through local aggression . . . Laos and South Vietnam, and especially the latter, constitute a critically important test case for the entire Peiping line." The consequences looked clear: "If the Communists 'get away with it' in these areas, Peiping will be vastly encouraged to undertake specific applications of its chosen strategic concepts. And it will have scored tellingly in its challenge to the Soviet leadership."
43 Although Harvey and Rice had yet to persuade the White House, their complementary assessments identified a troubling new element in the Vietnamese insurgency. Vietnam offered the Chinese the chance to score points against the Soviets and prove that their aggressive policy worked. North Vietnamese (read: Chinese) success would press the Soviets to support a more aggressive foreign policy. Harvey and Rice's conclusions fit perfectly with existing notions of Chinese aggressiveness and expansionism as well as the need for American military solutions. Incorporating their recommendations into U.S. China policy carried zero domestic political risk, while ignoring them could be dangerous.
In the next few months, the American Consulate General in Hong Kong and the intelligence community continued to monitor the Sino-Soviet dispute and changes in China's attitude toward Vietnam and Southeast Asia. A May SNIE indicated that the intelligence community had not detected any shifts in China's attitude toward Southeast Asia, concluding that the PRC currently supported "anti-US action in South Vietnam and Laos," and would continue constantly probing for weaknesses. The same report also stated that "we believe that over the next few years Communist China will follow relatively conservative and rational policies."
44 While at first glance these conclusions seem contradictory, a closer looks reveals their consistency with previous evaluations. A "conservative and rational policy" meant favoring subversion and economic support to overt military action. These conclusions supported the same firm stance in Southeast Asia that both Harvey's draft paper and assessments of the Great Leap Forward had advocated. The May SNIE would be the last intelligence estimate related to China conducted until May 1963. The administration spent much of the remainder of 1962 defusing tensions between Chiang Kai-shek and the mainland, evaluating the Sino-Indian War, and dealing with more pressing problems in the Caribbean. The absence of further discussions about Chinese intentions in Vietnam for the next several months indicates that the Kennedy Administration did not see any major changes in China's posture toward Southeast Asia or Vietnamese attitudes toward the Sino-Soviet rift.
After the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Sino-Indian War, the administration returned its attention to China and Vietnam. A November Policy Planning Council paper on China policy concluded that "relations between Communist China and the Soviets have long since reached the point of an effective but unacknowledged break." The Council's last report on China had warned that a full break would push China toward greater support of North Vietnam's efforts against the Saigon government, and this report stated, "A Communist triumph in South Vietnam would do much to revive the dimmed hopes of the Chinese elite, while a defeat would increase Chinese feelings of frustration." In response, the United States needed to do whatever it could to "ensure the failure of Communist insurgency in Southeast Asia."
45 The Policy Planning Council's November paper was the first acknowledgement of a full split between China and the Soviets. More importantly, it provided support to Rice's and Harvey's arguments and reaffirmed existing assumptions about Chinese intentions.
INR's Hilsman saw China as increasingly confident but still wary of overt aggression following its victory over India and the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. Writing to Secretary Rusk, Hilsman argued that "China will project an image of militancy but because of doubts about Soviet backing, will be less likely to expand unless risks are low." He interpreted China's unilateral withdrawal from India's disputed North East Frontier Agency as evidence that the PRC had won a painless victory and never intended further advance. He also believed that China's criticism of the Soviets following the Cuban Missile Crisis was disingenuous because "the Chinese have shown the utmost circumspection in dealing with the possibility of US retaliation." Regarding Vietnam, Hilsman stated that China would pursue a foreign policy over the next five years that emphasized "avoiding adventures or risks which might bring the regime into a military conflict with the US." China would commit ground troops to North Vietnam, he argued, only if the Hanoi government requested assistance in repelling an attack.
46 Hilsman and Whiting, who became Hilsman's deputy in March, offered the administration's soberest assessments on China, yet even Hilsman implied that without the threat of American retaliation, the Chinese would likely pursue some sort of expansionist policy in Southeast Asia.
The myth busters at the Far Eastern desk still proved unable to kick the core U.S. assumptions about Chinese expansionism. The State Department had competent China experts now for the first time since the McCarthy witch hunts, but these men-Whiting and Thomson-had junior positions, meaning they were excluded from high-level decision making. As Thomson later wrote, the "loss" of China still haunted the State Department, with men in the field recalling what happened to the World War II China experts who reported honestly. In Washington, groupthink created a narrow framework within which policymakers evaluated the already skewed field reporting coming in from Asia. Thomson remembered when an assistant secretary shot him down for merely suggesting that Vietnam was a civil war.
47 Had China experts like Davies or Service run the Far Eastern Bureau or perhaps served in senior roles on the NSC, some of the old shibboleths may have fallen.
But instead the Kennedy administration had to continue assessing implications of the Sino-Soviet dispute without real China or Vietnam expertise at the senior Marshall Green, reporting from the consulate in Hong Kong affirmed that "Peiping has thrown down the gauntlet to Moscow in an outright bid for leadership of the international Communist movement." Green stated that Beijing "evidently believes it has Asian Communist parties in its pocket." 49 This apparent escalation in the Sino-Soviet dispute prompted Thomas Hughes, who had replaced Hilsman as INR director after the latter became Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs in March, to report to his former boss that he noticed changes coming from Hanoi. Le Duan, first secretary of the central committee and North Vietnam's nominal number two leader behind Ho, captured Hughes's attention with a pro-Chinese speech on March 13. Previously, the DRV had striven to maintain neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute, but Hughes now reported that "there are indications that the Sino-Soviet dispute is mixed up with disagreements within the North Vietnamese leadership."
50 In his speech, Le Duan sharply denounced "Yugoslav revisionism"-this had long been Beijing's preferred method of criticizing Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev-and repeated China's line that only revolutionary violence could overthrow capitalism.
51 Never before had the Hanoi leadership made such a strong statement favoring one side. Ever since Harvey circulated his draft paper, Kennedy administration China-watchers had waited for indications that Hanoi was leaning in one direction or another. Although Hughes felt Le Duan's pro-Chinese comments indicated independence, his memo was the first indication noted by a government analyst that signaled a possible shift in Hanoi's stance.
Summertime investigation into the Moscow-Beijing-Hanoi triangle culminated in a July 31 NSC meeting in which participants discussed the latest SNIE on China. Minutes from the meeting reveal that CIA Director John McCone doubted that a final break between China and Russia had actually occurred. McCone's doubts, however, did nothing to stem his wariness of Chinese aggression, and Rusk recommended maintaining a state of high alert over the next few weeks to gauge possible changes in China's foreign policy posture. Referring to the secret ambassadorial talks taking place between PRC and U.S. representatives in Warsaw, Hilsman indicated that Ambassador Cabot would inform his Chinese counterpart that the PRC should not take actions in Vietnam that would indicate an escalation of Beijing's support. 52 The United States could increase its commitments to Diem, but the Kennedy administration expected the Chinese not to respond.
Hilsman, sounding conflicted, admitted to Rusk after the meeting that "South Vietnam provided a group through which the Chinese Communists could work and thus be doctrinally impeccable by 'assisting struggles of national liberation.'" Still, Hilsman questioned whether the Chinese had actually increased their support to the Vietnamese insurgency. He also cautioned that in the event they did so, U.S. military engagement "would run the very grave risk of confirming in the minds of the Vietnamese people the Communist propaganda theme that the US is taking over where the French left off."
53 Worried that increased involvement would lead to disaster for the United States but also fearful that China would eventually increase its support to the Vietnamese Communists, Hilsman's thinking reflected the administration's central dilemma in dealing with China and Vietnam: Avoiding another "lost China" situation in Southeast Asia without provoking another Korea.
Careful analysis of Chinese intentions continued immediately following the meeting, but intelligence analysts had not yet detected the PRC's increased support for Hanoi. Throughout 1963, the Chinese delivered the rifles and artillery that they promised during Ho's summer 1962 visit to Beijing.
54 Although in March 1963 Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong told a Polish diplomat that the DRV sought a neutralization conference that would allow an honorable American withdrawal, a PLA delegation to Hanoi the same month had repeated promises to defend the North and begun coordinating war plans with its Vietnamese counterparts.
55 A CIA special article circulated on August 2 showed that the Chinese had improved existing roads to Vietnam, which could now support military operations, but a memo sent the next week found no direct evidence of CCP involvement in the Viet Cong insurgency.
56 While speculating on numerous possibilities for increased Chinese assistance and cooperation with the DRV, 1963 , China 1961 -1963 Kennedy administration assessments on Chinese intentions in Vietnam ran the gamut from strident warnings of an imminent Chinese assault to dismissive conclusions that the Beijing regime was far too weak to do much of anything. In one way or another, however, nearly all these conclusions either affirmed the U.S. military commitment in the region or pushed for greater military pressure against the DRV. Kennedy's cautious escalation reflected his fears of another Korean War. This same cautious escalation, nevertheless, led to increased Chinese support to the DRV, who were determined to reunify Vietnam through armed struggle.
Only after Chinese foreign affairs archives open to the degree of their American counterparts will historians be able to determine how much China's support for the DRV was a reaction to U.S. escalation, but based on available evidence, Mao's ideological support of the DRV appears consistent with CCP foreign policy, and his materiel support appears largely reactive to U.S. moves. American China watchers had only limited capabilities to monitor Chinese material support, but anyone could read Red Flag. The aggressive rhetoric coming from Beijing conformed to U.S. policymakers' assumptions of China's expansionist tendencies.
Granted, some officials like Thomson and Kattenburg challenged prevailing ideas about China, but these men remained in the minority and lacked the clout of senior figures like McNamara and Rusk.
Both China and the United States erred in their assumptions about the other side. The Chinese saw the United States as determined to wage an imperial foreign policy and reduce South Vietnam to the status of a colony, and Americans saw China as determined to seek hegemony over Southeast Asia. Like Kennedy and Johnson, Mao, too, staked his own personal standing on holding the line in Vietnam. Because of his harsher rhetorical stance compared to the Soviets on supporting armed revolutionary struggle, he risked being deemed a hypocrite if he chose not to stand behind the DRV.
Credibility, writes Logevall, was the central factor in Johnson's decision to Americanize the war. In Choosing War, Logevall argues that personal credibility for men like Johnson, McNamara, and Bundy mattered more than Democratic Party credibility or America's international credibility.
73 Yet Logevall mentions little about how the China factor informed credibility during the Kennedy and Johnson years. An important part of that credibility goes back to 1949, when Mao's Communists won the Chinese Civil War. The China lobby and the Republican Party thus found a common cause, blaming the Truman administration and "traitors" in the State Department for Chiang Kai-shek's defeat. China's 1950 entrance into the Korean War fueled McCarthy's and the China Lobby's assault on America's China experts, creating a rigid domestic political orthodoxy and inflicting deep wounds on the State Department and the Democrats.
In the1960s, China remained central to Kennedy and Johnson administration notions of credibility. On an international geopolitical level, both administrations sought to bolster American credibility by using U.S. military power in South Vietnam to demonstrate the error of Beijing's aggressive rhetorical support for national revolutionary movements versus Moscow's support for peaceful coexistence. A firm stance against perceived Chinese expansionism in Southeast Asia enhanced Party credibility vis-à-vis the hard-line Republicans and China lobbyists who had painted the Democrats as soft on Communism and even un-American since the fall of Nationalist China. A less resolute stance toward perceived Communist expansionism, especially with the 1960 and 1964 elections in mind, would have been unthinkable for the Democrats. On a personal level, holding back or even reversing Communist gains in an Asian country provided Kennedy, Johnson, and the New Frontiersmen a chance to kick the "who lost China" stigma once and for all. But drawing the line against the "the specter of an expansionist China" in Vietnam proved to be a tragic miscalculation.
73. Logevall, Choosing War, 386-89.
